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This paper looks at the development of South Africa’s new Competition policy. Major 
focus falls on public interest objectives explicitly included in the Competition Act
1
 
(the Act) and decisions in merger review, where public interest issues have materially 
impacted decisions by competition authorities. The aim of the paper is to examine the 
role of public interest in merger evaluations and to note how traditional competition 
goals are reconciled with public interest considerations. 
 
The ultimate goal of any competition policy is to enhance consumer welfare. 
Achieving this goal has been a major challenge for Competition authorities in South 
Africa and other developing countries. In South Africa, this may be attributed to the 
fact that the South African Competition Act's policy purpose begins with economic 
efficiency, but extends much further. The Acts’ main purpose, ‘to promote and 
maintain competition’
2
, is supplemented by 6 (six) particular sets of goals. The first of 
these is the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy.
3
  The second 
goal, competitive prices and choices for consumers
4
, recognizes the foundation of an 
economic-based policy in concerns about consumer welfare. The other four sets of 
policy goals in section 2
5
, represent other public interest issues: employment and 
social and economic welfare, opportunities to participate in world markets (and to 
recognize competition in South Africa), equitable opportunities for small and 
medium-sized enterprises to participate in the economy, and increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons.   
 
The public interest goals are restated in section 12 (3) as issues that have to be 
considered by the commissioner or tribunal when evaluating mergers. 
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 4 
Furthermore the law’s preamble restates the law’s political motivations. They include 
policies of equity and distribution as well as efficiency and they clearly incorporate 
goals and ideals for competition law. The preamble characterizes the problem that the 
law seeks to address; that past practices, including apartheid, led to excessive 
concentration of ownership and control, inadequate restraints on anti-competitive 
trade practices, and unjust restrictions on full and free participation in the economy. 
The preamble states that the economy must be open to greater ownership by a great 
number of South Africans. All these are the concerns about equity and justice. 
Consistently with the important focus on equity, the preamble describes restrictions 
on free competition as “unjust,” rather than as “inefficient.” The preamble does 
recognize the problem of inefficiency and waste but connects these two with equity, 
in noting not only that a credible competition law and institutions to administer it are 
necessary for an efficient economy, but also that as efficient, competitive economic 
environment, balancing the interest of workers, owners and consumers and focus on 
development, will benefit all South Africans. 
 
The above structure has created difficulties for competition authorities. In most cases, 
they have to engage in a balancing act. They have to find a balance between public 
interest concerns and competition concerns as they evaluate transactions.  
Finding this kind of balance has led to the perception that competition concerns and 
public interest concerns carry equal weighting, as seen in the preamble of the Act and 
in some of the objectives stated in the Act.  
 
Related to the perception is that in some of the cases public interest issues may take 
precedence and some of the cases perhaps competition concerns may actually take 
precedence. It is assumed that it is decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 
In this paper I will therefore look at merger controls in South Africa and the effect 
public interest has had in practice concerning mergers. In looking at this effect, I will 
also try and dispel the perception that competition concerns and public interest 
concerns carry equal weighting. I will show that in most cases the Tribunal and the 
Competition Appeal Court (CAC) have developed a more coherent position for public 
interest in the context of the Act. The authorities have accepted that within the context 
of mergers, section 12A provides for a two-stage analysis. The first phase involves the 
 5 
determination by the Tribunal whether the Merger is likely to substantially lessen or 
prevent competition, having regard to the evidence and arguments presented before it 
by the parties. The enquiry is concluded by assessing the factors set out in section 
12A(2). The Tribunal can only move to the second stage that is looking at public 
interest grounds after it has made a competition finding.  However, in some cases, the 
Tribunal has been inconsistent in applying this approach.
6
 They have been criticized 
for bringing public interest into the primary enquiry. Lack of consistency may 
therefore be a challenge for the Legislature to clarify the position for public interest in 
the context of the Act. 
 
On a much broader note, I will look at the purpose of a competition policy and the 
perceived difficulties in reconciling a competition analysis with a public interest 
analysis. In order to illustrate this, the paper discusses the reasoning behind the 
incorporation of certain national and political objectives in South Africa’s competition 
law by setting out the background and history, which preceded the current legislation. 
Thereafter, the purpose and objectives of competition laws in particular merger 
controls.  
 
This is followed by the manner in which public interest provisions are applied in 
practice. A critical analysis of Section 12A is provided. Section 12A(1) does not make 
it clear that public interest must also be considered if a merger is found to 
substantially restrict competition but is justified on the basis that pro-competitive 
effects outweigh those negative effects in terms of section 12A(1)(a)(i).
7
 Section 
12A(1)(b) commences with the words "otherwise". This creates the impression that it 
will come into play only if the merger does not substantially prevent competition.
8
 
Public interest test, unlike the efficiency defence, possesses a "janusfaced" quality.
9
 It 
can save a merger that would have been rejected on pure competition criteria, but it 
may also lead to the rejection of a merger, which is not anti-competitive.
10
 The 
discussion thereafter, draws on the possibility of prohibiting a merger that is not anti-
                                               
6
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competitive, or approves a merger that is anti-competitive, on public interest grounds. 
Specific cases are cited as examples to illustrate the point. The paper concludes that 
despite the incorporation of non-competition factors in South Africa, there is a 
substantial degree of convergence with international anti-trust, that is, reconciliation is 
achievable. 
 
2. What is competition policy? 
 
Competition policy is a regulatory tool, which seeks to address market failures by 
maintaining or creating the foundations for effective functioning markets.
11
 In 
essence, competition policy aims to emulate free market conditions by creating 
regulatory institutions and procedures or laws that will ensure equal opportunities for 




It is agreed that the principal purpose of competition law is to structure the market for 
goods and services by imposition of controls designed to promote competition within 
the market.
13
 Some people contend that this is and must be the sole object; others, say 
that this should be the only object of its value to be preserved, because the law 
becomes less effective when its true purpose is mixed up with other objectives.
14
 They 
argue that non-competition objectives should not fall within the ambit of competition 
policy. Objectives like promotion of employment are seen as matters for 
microeconomic, not competition policy.
15
 It is argued that employment promotion, 
could, if elevated sufficiently highly in a competition policy judicial decision result in 
reduced efficiency and prices and products which competitive markets might shun.
16
 
Similarly, to adopt a policy to advance the (undefined) social welfare of South 
Africans might result in policies with outcomes contrary to those aimed under section 
2 (a) and (b) of the Competition Act, 1998. All the goals provided for in section 2 (c) 
to (f) are also said not to be matters for competition policy and would have negative 
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results in trying to achieve the traditional competition goals.
17
 The competition policy 
is seen as an inappropriate forum to address these goals. 
 
 However, others criticize the above views as being altogether too simplistic. They 
argue that the imperatives of the market, important as they are, must nevertheless be 
placed in the balance with other social objectives in order to produce results that give 
proper effect to the complex matrix of needs, aspirations and ideals operating in 
society at the time.
18
 Given the South African history of racial discrimination it is 
therefore not surprising to find non-competition objectives incorporated in the 
Competition Act. 
 
 South Africa is an example of a developing country, which has specific public 
interest goals incorporated in its competition legislation. This model of competition 
policy envisages Competition Authorities engaging in the balancing of various 
interests, namely those of workers and consumers when adjudicating competition 
matters. 
Here the regulation of competition is considered an instrument for economic 
development. However, the non-competition objectives are seen as secondary to the 
traditional objectives of competition law, that is, ‘to promote the efficiency, 
adaptability and development of the economy’ and ‘to provide consumers with 
competitive prices’.
19
 These goals top the section and this emphasises their 
importance.  
 
The principal goal of the Act is to promote consumer welfare and the resulting 
improvement in the welfare of society as a whole. This was also emphasised in Natal 
Association of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers & Others v Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd & 
others
20
 where it was held that “the main purpose of the South African Competition 
Act is to promote and maintain competition”.  The competition authorities have so far 
treated the competition goals with great respect and we can confidently predict that 
they will continue to reign superior in future judgements and rulings. 
 




  Martin Brassey Competition law 1
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 8 
The political history as it is seen in most developing countries will always influence a 
competition policy. It is clear that economic theories cannot be the sole determinant of 
policies adopted in any given period. Nevertheless, economic theories will always be 
an important source of influence on the adjudication of competition laws. 
 
Some developed countries do also realise that competition is not an end in itself. For 
example, section 1.1 of the Canadian Competition Act states: 
 
The purpose of this Act is maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order in 
order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to 
expand world markets while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign 
competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and medium sized enterprises 
have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in order to 
provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices. 
 
The Act thus recognizes the encouragement of competition as a means of achieving 
more fundamental goals: efficiency, expansion of world markets, protection of the 
opportunity for small business to compete, and protection of competitive prices and 
product choices.
21
 It is said that in many cases, the fundamental goals described in 
section 1.1 of the Canadian Competition Act are not in conflict.
22
 Promoting 
competition by preventing the monopolization of markets through inefficient 
exclusionary practices, for example leads to both efficiency and competitive prices.
23
 
But potential conflicts among the goals can arise. One potential conflict arise where 
small businesses would be harmed if a dominant firm were allowed to engage in 
efficiency-enhancing practices that disadvantage small firms, or if two large in a 
market were allowed to engage in a cost saving merger that lowered prices, thus 
harming small firms competing in the same market.
24
 Policy analysts rarely argue that 
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 Ibid p40 
25
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 9 
 
When looking at the South African Competition Act, a more contentious conflict 
arises between the fundamental goals of maximizing efficiency and achieving the 
most competitive prices for consumers. This conflict is most apparent in merger cases, 
where an acquisition may involve both significant gains in efficiency in the form of 
cost savings and an increase in prices because of a lessening of competition.
26
 In most 
cases the South African Competition Authorities resolved such potential conflict in 
favour of efficiency. However, this is a debate that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
It is argued that the basis in economics for favouring efficiency is sound.
27
 
Competition policy is said to be appropriately viewed as an instrument to maximize 
efficiency or the ‘total surplus’ gained by market participants.
28
 The use of 
competition policy to achieve not merely efficiency but an equitable distribution of 
wealth is therefore criticised. It is argued that it would result in an excessively 
complex and non-transparent set of legal rules that would be both uncertain and 
arbitrary – being determined by opinions or values of whoever was sitting on the 
tribunal in a particular case.
29
 It is believed that government should look at other 
avenues which are much better suited for the goal of distributing income equitably. 
 
It is common cause that under ideal conditions, competitive markets promote 
efficiency. This is seen as the most fundamental result of economics and the basis for 
competition policy.
30
 Actual markets may depart from competitive or ideal conditions 
for many reasons. The market outcome can be distorted by various externalities. It is 
therefore argued that the task competition law sets itself is ambitious.
31
 Competition 
cannot effectively provide a system of recompense for externalities. Externalities are 
described as the costs saved or benefits achieved by exploiting the goods, services or 
opportunities that are, by necessity or tradition, common property.
32
 Discharging 
waste in a common river is an externality; taking the benefit of communal lighting 
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without paying for it is a positive externality.
33
 Allocating these costs, which are in a 
sense beyond the market, is beyond the scope of a regulatory system devoted to the 
promotion of competition within the market.
34
 It is therefore argued that such a 
system, moreover, can say nothing and do nothing about the social desirability of its 
outcomes: it cannot, for instance, interfere to prevent the rich from getting what the 
poor might better use.
35
 Classic competition law does not take into account any of 
these shortcomings. It is therefore submitted that including social and political goals 
in the competition policy should not be viewed in the negative. 
 
3. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
COMPETION ACT     
 
Competition law in its modern form originated in North America.
36
 By 1985, most 
industrialised Western countries had adopted rules or laws aimed at restricting 





In South Africa, competition was regulated since 1979 by the Maintenance and 
Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979. The 1979 Act allowed the adjudication of 
Competition matters by the then Competition Board, which was appointed by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and which could investigate matters at its own 
initiative. The 1979 Act contained no explicit prohibitions, and while certain practices 
such as resale price maintenance, collusion on prices, trading terms and market 
division, as well as bid rigging, were subsequently declared outright illegal, there was 
no compulsory enforcement action or merger control. 
 
The South African Competition policy was less developed because of South Africa’s 
apartheid legacy, which led to its marginalisation from the global economy. In 
addition to the global marginalisation, domestic policy further compounded the 
competition challenges. High levels of concentration, both in ownership and control, 







 Minette Neuhoff A Practical guide to South African Competition Policy and Law LexisNexis 
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and conglomerate organisation structures coupled with strong vertical integration 
were typical of many industries and markets.
38
 Many firms had diversified their 
activities, investing in a variety of unrelated economic activities, and focused, almost 




The South African economy was characterised by a dual structure with a modern, 
almost-exclusively white formal economy, and a less-developed, almost exclusively 
black, predominantly informal economy.
40
 This dichotomous economic structure, and 
the apartheid laws, which prevented black South Africans from participating in certain 
economic activities and geographic areas, meant that participation in the formal 
economy, and opportunities to develop formal and growing businesses, was limited 
for black South Africans.
41
 By contrast the formal economy developed markets and 
industries that became in many cases highly concentrated with effective economic 




When the African national Congress (ANC) came into power in 1994, it recognised 
that these challenges would have to be addressed by a range of economic and social 
policies, and in addition to substantive focus on trade and industrial policies for 
transformation of the economy. The competition policy became the policy option for 
the regulation and development of enterprise to enhance economic opportunities and 




The ANC mapped out an extensive policy reform programme in the early 1990s, 
prior to the first democratic elections in 1994. The 1992 Policy Guidelines for a 
Democratic South Africa provided an overview of the policy revamp envisaged. As 
part of this process, an assessment of South Africa’s competition challenges and the 
efficacy of the existing competition law, was undertaken. A complementary initiative 
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was a review of South Africa’s industrial strategy.
44
 Key focus areas of the industrial 
strategy project were:  
• Markets and ownership structures  
• Small and medium enterprises, and the conglomerates  
• Technological and institutional capacities  
• Human resource development and workplace organisation  
 
Although this investigation into the development of an industrial strategy for South 
Africa focused narrowly on the manufacturing sector, the issues identified were also 
relevant to agriculture, mining and the services sectors.
45
 Many of the findings of this 
project related to competition issues, and in 1995, the new Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) started a three-year programme of consultation with competition 
experts and a broad range of stakeholders in South Africa to develop a new 
competition policy.
46
 The product of this extensive exercise was put forward in 1997, 
as ‘DTI’s Guidelines for Competition Policy,’ intended to stimulate discussion and 




Another complementary policy area that enjoyed much attention during the policy 
reform process was small business development. In 1993/4 an extensive empirical and 
theoretical study was conducted to identify key constraints to small business 
development in South Africa. A number of small business support initiatives were 
developed to actively promote small business development, with the expectation that 
small business would become an engine of growth and employment creation. These 
initiatives included financial schemes (loans or credit guarantees), skills support 




The 1997 DTI Competition Guidelines considered the existing competition law of 
1979, and found it wanting in a number of respects to address the challenges at hand. 
The 1979 Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act did not contain any 
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provisions related to vertical or conglomerate configurations or concentration of 
ownership. There were no pre-merger notification requirements. The 1979 Act 
contained no explicit prohibitions, and the final yardstick for decisions was the 
‘public interest’, which was not defined in the Act. The ad hoc and inconsistent 
decisions of the Competition Board were thus not unexpected. The Competition 
Board was appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, and a special court was to 
hear appeals; but never actually did hear any. A regulation issued by the Minister of 
Trade and Industry in 1984 declared some practices per se unlawful. These included 
resale price maintenance, horizontal collusion on price, terms or market share and bid 




Effective implementation of a strong competition policy was viewed as an important 
tool to regulate private enterprise, given that the ANC’s policy of nationalisation, 
which had been espoused prior to its election, had been abandoned, when the new 




Specific goals of competition policy included the dilution of the high level of 
concentration of economic power, on the grounds that this was detrimental to 
balanced economic development. In particular, competition law was to reduce the 





After a comprehensive policy process, which included debates within the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a new competition law, the 
Competition Act, no 89 of 1998 was promulgated and became effective in September 
1999. The Act provides for the establishment of three specific institutions to 
implement the law; a Competition Commission, a Competition Tribunal and a 
Competition Appeal Court. The Competition Act incorporates features, which reflect 
the unique challenges facing South Africa’s economic development. It permits and, 
in certain cases, requires consideration of equity issues such as empowerment, 
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employment and impact on small and medium enterprises. Enterprise development is 
thus an important focus for South Africa’s new competition policy and law. Although 
equity considerations are explicitly incorporated into South Africa’s competition law, 
political channels as a means of appealing these issues, are not permitted. There is 
also no ministerial power to override the decisions of the competition agencies, as 
there had been previously. The introduction of South Africa’s new competition 
policy and law took place within the broader context of a new industrial policy, a 
liberalised trade policy and revamped labour legislation in the second half of the 
1990s. This was a new era in policy making for economic transformation.  
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Competition Act it is stated that 
the overriding objective of competition policy is the promotion of competition in 
order to advance economic efficiency, international competitiveness and adaptability 
as well as the market access of small, medium and micro-enterprises (“SMMEs”), 
creation of new employment opportunities and the diversification of ownership in 
favour of historically disadvantaged South Africans. The equity or non-competition 
considerations recognise that South Africa’s discriminatory past resulted in a skewed 
distribution of ownership and control, inadequate restraint on anti-competitive trade 





The South African Competition Act draws heavily from developed countries’ 
experience and practices in the area. As a consequence, precedent in jurisdictions such 
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4. Merger Control  
 
Merger law differs from other areas of competition policy in that ‘it is prophylactic in 
nature: rather than attempting to control the exercise or abuse of market power, it 
seeks to prevent its creation in the first place.
54
 Under competition law, specific 
practices are prohibited in advance.
55
 In the case of mergers, ex-ante control takes 
place. In this case enterprises party to a proposed merger or acquisition above a 
certain threshold are required to give prior notification, upon which competition 
authorities assess the potential impact of the reduction of competition due to the 




Competition policy on horizontal mergers is based on the proposition that an increase 
in concentration in a market can led to an increase in market power. The 
consequences of increased market power are higher prices, resulting in inefficiently 




The link between increased market concentration and greater market power is obvious 
in the extreme case of a merger of two firms to monopoly in a market with strong 
barriers to entry.
58
 Monopoly prices exceed duopoly prices. The impact of mergers in 
more moderately concentrated markets with low barriers to entry is more difficult to 
assess, and depends upon market conditions.
59
 In a merger case, economic theory 
provides a framework for bringing evidence to bear on market conditions that affect 
the impact of the merger.
60
 The competition authorities adopt a framework for 
investigating mergers. However, as recognized in guidelines, the facts arising in each 
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    4.1 Definition of a merger  
 
A merger occurs when one or more firms directly or indirectly acquire or establish 
direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the other business of another firm.
61
 
The definition applies to any direct or indirect acquisition of control over a business. 
It does not require that the business being acquired should belong to a competitor, 
supplier or customer or other person.
62
 Nor does it stipulate that the acquisition must 
be of a ‘substantial interest’ a requirement that had been incorporated from the 
Canadian Legislation, where it serves the function of the catch-all section now to be 
found in s 12 (2) (g) of the Act. 
 
The definition covers horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. It also requires 
there to be a ‘business’ involved, although that term is not defined in the Act.
63
 
Section 12 (1) (b) states that a merger may be achieved through the purchase or lease 
of the shares, an interest or the assets of the target firm or by an amalgamation or 
combination with it. The scope is broad but is necessary to prevent evasion.
64
 It is the 
acquisition of control that is decisive and s 12 (2) sets out at length, different 
categories of control. Paragraphs (a) to (f) clearly stipulate conventional forms of 
control over firms.  
 
    4.2 What constitutes control? 
 
What constitutes ‘control’ was analyzed at length by the Competition Tribunal in the 
case of Bulmer SA (Pty) Ltd & Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd / Distillers Corporation (SA) 
Lts, Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group (Pty) Ltd & The Competition Commission.
65
 
The decision was upheld by the Competition Appeal Court.
66
 This transaction 
involved the acquisition by Distillers of the business of SFW, both of whom had 
common shareholding 90% of their share capital, namely Rembrandt, KWV and SAB 
with 30% each. The remaining 10% was held by the public, but not necessary the 
                                               
61
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same persons. Rembrandt and KWV had combined their holdings through a single 
company, Rembrandt-KWV Investments, which thus held 60% of the shares in each 
company. The purchase consideration was payable in new Distillers shares which 
were to be distributed to the SFW shareholders by a dividend in spicie. The end result 
was one larger single entity the shares of which were held as to 90% by the same 
persons who held shares in SFW. 
 
The merging parties argued before the commission that the merger was not a 'merger' 
for the purposes of the Act as there was no change in ultimate control. The 
Commission agreed and the merger was implemented without notification based on 
this analysis. Bulmer and Seagrams, two competitors, challenged this result. They 
contended that the two respondent companies had always been separate and distinct 
juristic and business competitors and as a consequence, their merger would 
significantly affect and hamper competition in the liquor industry. 
 
At the Tribunal the question was whether there was an acquisition of control. The 
Tribunal held that s12 does not purport to define control, but merely circumstances in 
which a person controls a firm. It does not purport to create an exhaustive list of the 
circumstances where control exists. This evidenced by the fact that s12(2) does not 
provide for the simplest of merger transactions contemplated by s12(1)(a), ie the 
purchase of assets. The Tribunal then stated that s12(2) listed cases of indirect control 
being covered by s12(1). 
 
The applicants argued that all the elements of s12(1) were satisfied in that Distillers, a 
person acquired direct control over the business of SFW by way of an asset purchase. 
Thus there was a merger, which had to be notified. This involved a literal 
interpretation of the statute, and the respondents argued against such an approach on 
the basis that it cannot have been the legislature's intention to extend the burden of 
notifications beyond the mischief for which it was intended to deal. They argued that 
what the legislature required to be notified were only changes to 'ultimate' control and 
'effective control'. 
 
The respondents argued that one must distinguish between the form and substance of 
control. As a matter of form Distillers assumed control over SWF's business, but 
 18 
given that they were both controlled by the same shareholders prior to the transaction, 
and the combined entity will remain so controlled post-transaction, no change in 
effective control had taken place and therefore there was no merger. They argued that 
s12(2) listed different instances of ultimate or effective control. Where firms are 
located in the same economic family a rearrangement between a purchaser and seller 
within the family does not lead to change of effective control and thus falls outside of 
s12. Reference was made to cases in the European Union and United States where the 




However, the single economic entity doctrine is relied on principally in those 
jurisdictions in assessing restrictive practices, an area of substantive law. The 
Tribunal was of the view that it had to apply caution in determining whether the 
doctrine applied to the merger notification, an area of procedural law. The Tribunal 
stated: 
'…A change in direct control presumptively triggers the obligation to notify. 
However, we recognize that a limited class of transaction exists where the obligation 
may be negated if there is irrefutable evidence that indirect control remains 
unaffected. This is a case of firms who form part of a single economic unity, because 
the change in the direct form of control is illusory and has not altered the substance 
of control that both antedated and postdates the transaction… The less something 
looks like a wholly owned parent subsidiary relationship the more cautious we need 
to be. To put it in another way, the more ambiguous the case for a single economic 
entity the less scope there is for rebutting the inference that a direct acquisition has 
led to a change of control.' 
 
The Tribunal concluded that in relation to s12(1): 
- the scope to accept argument about a single economic entity as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite must at this stage of enquiry be limited to the jurisdictional 
prerequisite must at this stage of enquiry be limited to the clear-cut cases 
suggested by s 4(5), dealing with restrictive practices within the same 
economic entity: 
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- s12 read as a whole conceives of control as an event-based concept which 
means that control can be acquired by one person by virtue of one provision of 
s12(2) while it still resided in another person by virtue of another provision of 
the section. This does not lead to absurdity, as control is a notion determined 
both de jure and de facto and is not always rigidly reposed in one person at 
any given moment. 
The Tribunal then applied this logic to the facts of the case. What appears to have 
been fatal in this case to the argument of the respondent was that although between 
them, KWV, Rembrandt and SAB had 90% of the shares, pre- and post-merger, the 
respondents could not satisfy the Tribunal that there was concerted action between 
then to indicated that they formed a single controlling mind. They held 30% each. At 
best for them, the Tribunal held, was that when the three shareholders concurred, they 
could prevail. 'What they have not demonstrated is some factual or legal framework to 
indicate that the shareholders act in concert on a regular basis to control the alleged 
group leading to the conclusion that collectively they constitute a single controlling 
consciousness.' 
 
The applicants alleged that the respondents were in fact competitors. They were 
separate legal entities, controlled by separate boards of directors, had operated 
separately under separate JSE Listings and had publicly held themselves out to 
shareholders as being in competitive relationship to the benefit of shareholders. 
 
On the facts the Tribunal concluded that the respondents had not established that a 
single controller prior to the transaction controlled the two firms. Neither they nor the 
three common shareholders constituted a single economic entity. Distillers, a person, 
acquired direct control over the business of another person. Hence a merger had taken 
place, which the parties were ordered to notify.  
 
The Competition Appeal Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. The Appeal Court 
did not decide the issue on whether or not there was change in ultimate control. It 
analyzed the provisions of chapter 3 of the Act and what they sought to achieve read 
together with the purposes of the Act. The Court stated: 
'The applicable sections of the Act thus provide a clear indication of the purpose of 
Chapter 3, namely that the transaction which are likely to substantially lessen 
 20 
competition should be carefully examined by the competition authorities. This 
interpretation is supported by the preamble to the Act… Section 2 provides that the 
purpose of the Act is to promote competition in the Republic. It follows that the Act 
was designed to ensure that the competition authorities examine the widest possible 
range of merger transactions to examine whether competition was impaired and this 





The Court did not accept the argument that if there was no change in ultimate control, 
there was no notifiable merger. This was not mandated by the express wording of 
s12(1) which made no express provision for the exclusion of transactions between a 
company and its wholly owned subsidiary from the definition of merger. 
'For this reason the purpose of merger control envisages a wide definition of control, 
so as to allow the relevant competition authorities to examine a wide range of 
transactions which could result in an alteration of market structure and in particular 
reduces the level of competition in the relevant market.' 
 
The Appeal Court therefore did not decide the issue on whether or not there was a 
change in ultimate control. It took a slightly broader approach than the Tribunal. To 
reach its conclusion, it analysed the provision of Chapter 3 of the Act and what they 
sought to achieve read together with the purpose of the Act. 
 
5. Evaluation of a merger 
 
Section 12A of the Act
69
 states that, in evaluating a merger, the commissioner has to 
first consider whether the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen 
competition. Factors considered by the commission are stated in subsection (2), they 
include; 
- the actual and potential level of import in the market; 
- the ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers 
- the level and trend of concentration, and history of collusion, in the market 
- the degree of countervailing power in the market 
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- the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market 
- whether the business or part of the business of a party to the merger or 
proposed merger has failed or is likely to fail, and 
- whether the merger will result to the removal of an effective competitor. 
 
If the commission finds that the merger is likely to have an anti-competitive effect, it 
may still find the merger to be justifiable on the basis (i) of efficiency, or (ii) on the 




Furthermore, s12A(3) provides that when determining whether a merger can or cannot 
be justified on public interest grounds, the Competition Commission or Tribunal must 
consider the effect that the merger will have on- 
(a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) employment 
(c) the ability of small and black business to become competitive, and 
(d) the ability of national industries to compete internationally. 
 
To summarize the section, the merger evaluation process therefore entails the 
commission or Tribunal to first establish whether the merger is likely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition. Second, If decided that merger will lessen competition, 
then it must be established whether the merger will result in ‘technological, efficiency 
or other pro-competitive gains’ that will outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the 
merger. The efficiency test is therefore included as a defence for an anti-competitive 
merger transaction. Third, irrespective of the outcome of the evaluation of the 
competition impact of the merger, a public interest test has to be conducted. Even 
though a merger may not have an adverse effect on competition, it still has to be 
reviewed on public interest grounds. The public interest test can also work to resurrect 
a merger that is otherwise found anti-competitive. This test is therefore mandatory in 
all merger assessments. 
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It is this reason that the principle of having explicit public interest goals brings fears 
that efficiency will be overlooked in favour of equity. However in practice such fears 
have no basis as authorities take a cautious approach to public interest pleas.  
 
 
6. Discussion of the Public Interest Criteria in merger evaluation 
 
As seen above, the public interest considerations are specifically stated in the  
 Act. If the merger is found to restrict or prevent competition substantially, section 
12A(1)(a)(ii) provides that it must be determined whether “the merger can or cannot 
be justified on substantial public interest grounds” listed in the Act. Section 
12A(1)(b) also states that competition authorities evaluating the merger must 
“otherwise determine whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial 
public interest grounds”.  
 
It has been argued that section 12A (1) is not well formulated. Section 12A (1)(a)(ii) 
and in section 12A(1)(b) both use of the phrase "can or cannot be justified". It was 
argued that this may create the impression that the merger may be condemned only if 
it would also be against public interest and that it cannot be approved unless it can be 
positively justified on public interest grounds, irrespective on whether the merger is 
pro-competitive or anti-competitive.
71
 However, the tribunal in the Gold Fields
72
 case 
rejected this interpretation. It has proposed that the words “can or cannot” were 
included to indicate that public interest criteria do not always point in the same 
direction, but that they will have to be weighed up against each other and that a net 
public interest effect of a merger must be determined.
73
 Moreover, it has been 
suggested that the phrase was also included to allow competition authorities to 
confirm conclusions reached on competition grounds, on the basis of public interest.
74
 
Sometimes, competition and net public interest will point in the same direction and, in 
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Section 12A(1) does not make it clear that public interest must also be considered if a 
merger is found to substantially restrict competition but is justified on the basis that 
pro-competitive effects outweigh those negative effects in terms of section 
12A(1)(a)(i).
76
 Section 12A(1)(b) commences with “otherwise”. This creates the 
impression that it will come into play only if the merger does not substantially prevent 
competition.
77
 However, the Tribunal has made it quite clear that public interest issues 
should also be considered in these situations.  
 
In matter of Anglo American Holdings Limited /Kumba Resources Limited (Industrial 
Development Corporation Intervening),
78
 the Tribunal held that the use of the word 
“otherwise” in the Act means that the public interest evaluation must be undertaken 
regardless of the outcome of the overall “competition” analysis. In other words, even 
if the Tribunal found that the merger would not lead to a substantial prevention or 
lessening of competition, this did not mean that the merger should necessarily be 
approved. It was held that even if the merger would not adversely affect competition, 
such merger could only be approved if the Tribunal was satisfied that in addition to 
having no anti-competitive effect, no public interest grounds exist on which the 
merger should be prohibited. 
 
So Public interest test, unlike the efficiency defence, possesses a "janusfaced" 
quality.
79
 It can save a merger that would have been rejected on pure competition 
criteria, but it may also lead to the rejection of a merger, which is not anti-
competitive.
80
 However, competition authorities are unlikely to prohibit a merger that 
is not anti-competitive, or approve a merger that is anti-competitive, on public interest 
grounds.
81
. Competition law is not directly aimed at protecting any of these 
interests.
82
 In various cases the Tribunal has decided that: 
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“in many respects our jurisdiction in these areas is secondary, as these other statutes 
and the institutions that they create, are better placed and resourced to deal directly 
and effectively with these issues than are we, given that our discretion is described in 




The Tribunal has however not been consistent in applying the above approach. In 
Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd and Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd
84
 The 
Tribunal commenced its determination of whether the merger was likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition (s 12A (2)(e) of the Act) with an analysis 
of the “general state of healthcare provisioning in South Africa the policy objectives 
of the South African government in the realm of healthcare provision, the 
mechanisms whereby government intends achieving those objectives and the place 




The Tribunal brought the public interest when looking at whether the merger is likely 
to substantially prevent or lessen competition. Things like mechanisms by which 
Government intends to achieve its policy objectives and the place and role of the 
private sector in these objectives are issues, which fall within the purview of 
Parliament and the Executive; they are not issues that fall within the remit of the 
competition authorities. 
 
The Tribunal concluded its analysis by stating that: 
 
“ It is our view then, that in this extremely fluid context, the absence of an established 
and stable regulatory framework for this embryonic market as well as for some 
related and long-standing markets (for example, pharmaceuticals) demands that we 
adopt a particularly cautious and circumspect approach to private interventions, such 
as this merger, that will inevitably impact on the development of the market under 
consideration. Public interest considerations impinging on the outcome of 
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interventions in this area- be they interventions by the State, by regulators or by 
private market participants- are, for unimpeachably good reason unusually intense 
and this also predisposes us to particular circumspection.” 
 
The Tribunal clearly went against the more established approach. The more coherent 
position for public interest in the context of mergers is that section 12A provides for a 
two-stage analysis. The first phase involves the determination by the Tribunal whether 
the Merger is likely to substantially lessen or prevent competition, having regard to 
the evidence and arguments presented before it by the parties. The enquiry is 
concluded by assessing the factors set out in section 12A(2). The Tribunal can only 
move to the second stage that is looking at public interest grounds after it has made a 
competition finding.  
 
There is no textual support in the Act for bringing public interest into the primary 
enquiry. The need to consider public interest grounds compromises a separate and 
subsequent enquiry to the primary determination, which involves a competition 
analysis.  
 
The finding of the Tribunal is therefore surprising as stated above that in earlier cases, 
the Tribunal had held that Competition law is not directly aimed at protecting any 
other interests. This means that a competition analysis should not be mixed with 
public interest considerations. Jurisdiction in public interest areas is secondary, as 
there are other statutes and the institutions that are created, that are better placed and 
resourced to deal directly and effectively with these issues than they are, given that 
their discretion is described in section 12A(3) at a high level of abstraction and 
generality. 
 
On appeal, the CAC
86
 reiterated the approach adopted in previous cases. It held that 
within the context of mergers, section 12A provides for a two-stage analysis.
87
 The 
first phase involves the determination by the Tribunal whether the merger is likely to 
substantially lessen or prevent competition, having regard to the evidence and 
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argument presented before it by the respondent and the parties.
88
 The inquiry is 
conducted by assessing the factors set out in section 12A(2). The word likely has its 
prime meaning of “probability” whilst the word “substantially” means materially or 




The court further held that the manner in which the Tribunal justifies its finding on 
the evidence before it is of critical importance. The court referred to the case of Mondi 
Ltd and Kohler Cores and Tubes v Competition,
90
 it said: 
“ The decision required by section 12A(1) must be made on evidence which is 
available to the Tribunal. In other words the Tribunal cannot base its decision upon 
speculation of a kind, which cannot be attributed to any evidential foundation placed 
before the Tribunal. But the prohibition against unjustified speculation should not be 
confused with the need for a predictive judgment. The section enjoins the Tribunal to 
forecast a likely possibly, that is, it makes a predictive judgment, based on evidence 




It follows therefore that if the Tribunal finds on the evidence available that the merger 
is capable of having the anti-competitive effect contemplated, the test would have 
been satisfied.
92
 However, the Tribunal can only move to the second stage after it has 
made this finding. In the present case, the Tribunal adopted a “cautious and 





The court found it extremely difficult to determine the weight, which the Tribunal 
gave to these public interest grounds in its probabilistic enquiry. The public interest 
issues should have been of no relevance to the first stage of its enquiry, which needed 
to examine the evidence relating to the proposed merger’s impact upon competition.
94
  
Public interest considerations would have been more appropriately considered during 
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the second phase in terms of section 12A(3), as the need to consider public interest 




The court then held that in the result, the Tribunal misdirected itself by adopting an 
incorrect test when assessing the evidence. It failed to engage fully with the 
probabilistic enquiry of the evidence presented before it. It failed to apply the test set 




The Medicross case highlights one of the few inconsistencies by the Tribunal in 
dealing with section 12A. These inconsistencies create the perception that competition 
considerations and public interest considerations are in equal weighting. That in some 
cases public interest issues may take precedence and some of the cases perhaps 
competition concerns may actually take precedence because it is decided on a case-
by-case basis  
 
It is submitted that the two-stage inquiry is the right approach, given that public 
interest is described in section 12A(3) at a high level of abstraction and generality. 
The two-stage approach therefore creates a more coherent position for public interest 
in the context of the Act. It is further submitted that to avoid future inconsistencies 
and perceptions, there is a challenge to the Legislature to clarify the position for 
public interest in the context of the Act. 
 
However in most cases as we will see in the discussion below, what seems to be the 
most important effect of the public interest criteria has been that the authorities 
frequently approve mergers subject to conditions that protect the public interest.
97
 The 
Tribunal has used the two-stage approach with the primary inquiry being a 
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7. Cases involving Public interest grounds listed in the Act 
 
7.1 The effect on a particular industrial sector or region 
 
The effect on a particular industrial sector or region must be considered. The use of 
the word "sector" instead of “market" allows for a wide range of issues to be 
considered. In Anglo American Holdings Ltd / Kumba Resources Ltd,
98
 Anglo alleged 
that it would invest heavily on the target company, Kumba, after the merger. The 
Tribunal did not determine under which public interest concern, listed in section 
12A(3), this issue had to be considered, but it must be likely that it falls under this 
rubric.
99
 However it was decided that Anglo did not show that it was either obliged to 
make the proposed investments or that it was likely to do so.
100
 Public interest gains 
from the merger were not certain enough to warrant consideration absent the 




The term 'industrial sector' should be interpreted widely to include any sector of 
economic activity
102
. In Nasionale Pers Ltd / Education Investment Corporation 
Ltd,
103
  the Tribunal had to evaluate a merger in the education sector. It was noted that 
education is central to the South African economy and society, and that apartheid has 
left a scar upon, and massive challenges to, this sector. Education is particular 
important in addressing the legacy of apartheid, which left a large number of students 
unprepared for the world of work and so hampered the social and economic 
development of South Africa. The Tribunal accordingly paid careful attention to the 
merger to protect the access of prospective students to education. This was clearly 
regarded as significant in terms of section 12A(3)(a), but it was apparently also 
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In PSG Investment Bank Holdings Ltd / Real Africa Durolink Holdings Ltd,
105
 the 
Tribunal considered the systematic harm caused by the exit of a bank from the 
market. Again it was not stated what public interest aspect was relevant here, but it 
was suggested that it concerned the effect, which the merger would have on a 
particular "industrial sector".
106
 However, a competition authority should be 
conservative in addressing this aspect as a public interest issue.
107
 It is preferable for 




7.2 The effect of the merger on Employment 
 
Of the various public interest grounds contained in the merger provisions, 
employment has thus far received a fair deal of consideration. When evaluating the 
effect of the merger on employment Competition authorities will keep in mind that 
other regulatory regimes provide more direct protection for employees. They will not 
be prepared to interfere with regard to wages, collective bargaining and working 
conditions.
109
 The most important rights given to employees by competition laws are 
procedural. It allows employees to receive timeous information about mergers that 
often affect them deeply. 
 
To ensure that the effect of a merger on employment is properly analysed by the 
Competition Authorities before approving such merger, input from affected 
employee groups and trade unions are considered. The Act specifically requires that 
trade unions and/or employee representatives of affected employees be notified of any 
proposed mergers that are notifiable to the Competition Authorities.
110
 This is 
achieved by the requirement that parties to a merger serve a copy of the merger 
notification made to the Competition Authorities on such trade unions or employee 
representatives, prior to the submission thereof to the Competition Authorities. Of 
importance is the practical reality that a merger cannot be registered with the 
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Commission until proof is provided to the Commission that service has been affected 
on trade unions or employees, where applicable. 
 
The involvement of employee organisations may materially affect the implementation 
of a proposed merger. An illustration is the case of Unilever PLC /Competition 
Commission/ CEPPWAWU.
111
 CEPPWAWU was a trade union representing the 
interests of chemical, energy, paper, printing, wood and allied workers. In this case 
the public interest concern was the number of potential job losses in South Africa, 
which already has a high unemployment rate.  
 
The Tribunal held that a valid assessment of the effect of the merger on employment 
could not be conducted on the information made available by the parties. Hence, the 
Tribunal imposed as a condition for the approval of the merger an obligation on the 
merging parties to consult the trade unions regarding job losses, as a pre-condition to 
approving the merger. The Tribunal maintained that the most significant right that the 
Competition Act extended to employees and the unions was the right to timeous 
information with respect to the potential employment impact of a merger. However 
despite the above, the Tribunal felt that the most powerful channel for unions to 
address employment related issues arising from a merger was labour specific 
legislation, being the Labour Relations Act, 1995, or private collective bargaining 
agreements. The Tribunal therefore approved the merger subject to conditions. 
 
What is important to note is that this public interest concern also empowers 
competition authorities to protect levels of employment through conditions. What is 
also interesting in this case is that the trade unions also made submissions to the 
Tribunal regarding competition issues. They maintained that the merger should be 
prohibited entirely because of the high levels of concentration in the market and the 
dominance of the merging parties. They also argued that the relationship between the 
major retailers and manufacturers, including the merging parties, was not based on 
countervailing power in the market, but rather on profitable mutual dependence. Here 
the trade unions were allowed not only to provide submissions on employment issues, 
but also on competition issues. It was found by the Tribunal ultimately that the 
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implementation of the merger, subject to conditions, was not likely to substantially 
lessen or prevent competition.  
 
A further case involving employment issues was the matter of DB Investments SA v 
De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited.
112
 Here trade unions representing employees 
affected by the merger raised concerns in respect of an adverse impact on 
employment as a result of the merger. This resulted in the merging parties offering an 
undertaking to the employees that their conditions of employment would not change 
following the merger. This undertaking was however not made in perpetuity. The 
Tribunal held that it could not be expected of an employer to provide a perpetual 
undertaking and accordingly approved the merger. 
 
It is interesting to note how the explicit consideration of public interest grounds has 
influenced the thinking of the Competition Authorities on other occasions. The 
Nedcor/Stanbic
113
 case, a hostile merger between two banks where Nedcor Limited 
sought to acquire more than 49% of the shares in Standard Bank Investment 
Corporation Limited, is an example of the weight given to public interest concerns in 
South Africa. The merger between the banks fell to be determined in terms of the 
Banks Act (since the merger was subject to authorisation by public regulation which 
provision has now been changed). The Minister of Finance was to act after 
consultation with the Competition Authorities. The Minister, in declining approval of 
the merger in terms of the Banks Act, quoted the Competition Commission’s 
recommendations, which he relied on in making his decision as follows:  
 
“In conclusion, therefore, the Commission is of the view that the proposed 
transaction should be prohibited on the grounds that it will have significant social 
costs (primarily) potential abuse of market power in the retail banking market and 
potential job losses), which represents a net loss to society, which cannot be offset by 
any potential efficiency gains or public interest considerations.” 
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In the case of Daun et Cie AG / Kolosus Holdings Ltd
114
 trade unions expressed 
corncens and sought assurances that job losses as a consequence of the merger would 
be limited. Despite indicating in their initial submission that the worst-case scenario 
with regard to job losses would 150, the merging parties acknowledged during the 
hearing that the ultimate number of job losses could potentially exceed this number. 
The competition Tribunal imposed a condition, which required the parties to limit the 
number of job losses to 150 for a year post-merger. 
 
In its decision, the Competition Tribunal emphasised that: 
'…the notification requirements exist precisely to ensure transparent disclosure of all 
material aspects of the transaction at any early stage. This is intended to allow the 
competition authorities and, with regard to labour issues, the trade unions to react 
accordingly. It is improper for the notification forms to be "sugar coated" merely to 
ensure a favourable reaction, while later in the process, less favourable facts are 





The Tribunal further stated that they also take cognisance that it is rather easy for 
companies to disguise merger related retrenchments so that it appears that this will 
occur absent the merger. They were of the opinion that this practices are strongly 
discouraged and the importance of transparent and bona fide disclosure was once 
again emphasised. 
 
In the case of Tiger Brands Ltd / Ashton Canning Company (Pty) Ltd and Other
116
 the 
consequence of the merger was the loss of 45 permanent jobs and 1000 seasonal jobs. 
For this reason, the Competition Commmission sought to impose a condition that, 
amongst others, provided for the creation of a training fund to the value of R2 million 
to the benefit of retrenchment workers and other members of the Ashton community. 
The merging parties considered the amount of R2 million as excessive and instead 
offered an amount of R250 000 for retraining. 
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The Competition Tribunal approved the merger subject to conditions which included: 
• That the merging parties would not retrench more than 45 employees from the 
aggregate number of employees employed by both firms immediately prior to 
the order; and 
• That the merging parties make available an amount of R2 million for the 




The above cases have demonstrated that this public interest concern also empowers 
competition authorities to protect levels of employment through conditions. On the 
face of it, it is difficult to distinguish protection of employment levels from 
interference in other aspects of employment.
118
 Yet it has been accepted that, 
“because of the powerful link between direct employment loss and a restructuring 
initiative like a merger, it is undoubtedly in this area that the legislature intended a 
role for the competition authorities.
119
 However, interference by competition 
authorities, even on this level, is said to create difficulties.
120
 Competition authorities 
will not merely consider the number of jobs lost through the merger, but they will 
rather look at the substantial effect, which the merger has on employment.
121
 In this 
regard, the question whether retrenchment packages are sufficient, and whether 
retrenchments are properly negotiated, will be more important than the number of 
jobs lost.
122
 Often levels of employment cannot be maintained at pre-merger levels in 
efficient gains are to be realised.
123
 Loss of managerial positions is not considered to 
be as serious as losses of unskilled jobs.
124
 The skills of managerial staff are regarded 
as more marketable.
125
 It will not be sufficient to show that job losses will occur after 
the merger. It is necessary to prove that the job losses will be a consequence of the 
merger.
126
 Competition authorities will be loath to strike down mergers on the basis 
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that jobs will be lost.
127
 In many case the problem of job losses can be addressed by 
imposing conditions. 
 
7.3 The effects of a merger on the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons to become 
competitive. 
 
The effects of a merger on the ability of small businesses, firms controlled or owned 
by historically disadvantaged persons to become competitive must be evaluated. In 
case of Anglo American Holdings Ltd and Kumba Resources Ltd,
128
 the 
Competition Tribunal approved the merger between Anglo American Plc and Kumba 
Resources. Anglo (a firm traditionally having a significant standing in the South 
African mining industry) attempted to purchase Kumba, a black economic 
empowerment company. In this case the Industrial Development Corporation 
("IDC"), a statutory body whose primary function is to foster economic development 
pertaining to black owned businesses, intervened on public interest grounds. The 
IDC argued that the merger would pose a barrier to entry for potential black firms, 
and therefore impede empowerment in the industry. The IDC recommended that 
Kumba needed to remain a black economic empowerment controlled firm.  
 
The IDC maintained that in interpreting the provisions in the Competition Act 
pertaining to black economic empowerment, the Tribunal ought to adopt a purposive 
interpretation and not confine itself to the literal wording of the Competition Act. 
Hence, the IDC argued, that when interpreting the Competition Act the Tribunal 
must respect the objects of promoting a greater spirit of ownership and increasing 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons in South Africa. They wanted the 
provision to be interpreted widely in the light of the preamble and section 2. That the 
apartheid economic system led to excessive concentration in the economy and it was 
one of the goals of the Act to promote a wider spread of ownership of economic assets 
by a greater number of South Africans. It was accordingly argued that a merger 
between Anglo and Kumba, should be prohibited or allowed only subject to 
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conditions to allow for these assets to come into the hands of previously 
disadvantaged persons. 
  
Anglo, on the other hand, argued that the Tribunal ought not to use a broad 
interpretation of these provisions. In its argument Anglo submitted that such an 
interpretation would have dangerous policy consequences, because it would transform 
the Competition Act from an antitrust statute into an unchecked vehicle for 
redistribution. Anglo argued further that the legislature had not intended to invest 
such an ambitious power in an un-elected body without clear language in the 
provisions. 
 
 In it's finding the Tribunal did not pronounce on which interpretation was the correct 
one. However, it did say that if the IDC’s approach were to be applied, there was no 
evidence to suggest that the merger would frustrate the Competition Act’s purpose. 
The Tribunal found no evidence to suggest that the merger would close the door on an 
increase of historically disadvantaged persons’ ownership in the industry. The 
Tribunal therefore approved the merger. Furthermore, it was not sufficiently shown 
that the interests of previously disadvantaged persons in Kumba would not be 
increased despite the Anglo take-over. Anglo had given notice of its intention to 
comply with other rules that required empowerment transactions to be concluded, and 
it had concluded a memorandum of understanding with government according to 
which it also agreed to promote the interests of previously disadvantaged persons. 
The Tribunal stated that although it had not found for the IDC in this decision, it 
benefited from its participation as an intervener, given the economic and social 
significance of this transaction. 
 
In the case of the large merger between Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Tepco 
Petroleum (Pty) Ltd,
129
 Thebe, a black economic empowerment company attempted to 
sell off its subsidiary Tepco, to Shell South Africa. The reason for the sale was that 
Tepco found itself in financial problems, suffering net losses due to the mature nature 
of the industry as well as high structural barriers to entry. In accordance with the 
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Competition Act, the first question the Tribunal asked was whether the merger was 
likely to prevent or lessen competition. In this regard it found that the merger was not 
likely to prevent or lessen competition.  
 
The second question that the Tribunal asked was whether there were any public 
interest grounds for not approving the merger. The Tribunal considered the effect that 
the merger would have on the ability of small, black owned/controlled firms to 
become competitive. The Tribunal noted that the Commission had approved the 
merger subject to a number of conditions. One of the conditions imposed by the 
Commission was that Tepco had to continue to exist in the market jointly 
controlled/owned by Thebe and Shell South Africa. However, the Tribunal was 
critical of this condition because it amounted to the parties restructuring the deal in a 
form that neither of the parties wanted. The Tribunal stated: 
“Empowerment is not furthered by obliging firms controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons to continue to exist on a life support machine.” 
 
The Tribunal was also critical of a number of other conditions imposed by the 
Commission on the proposed merger. In fact, the Tribunal approved the merger 
without any conditions. The Tribunal found that the Commission had adopted a 
paternalistic approach. No doubt, the Tribunal’s reasoning and decision is far more 
tempered and accepts an evaluation based on sound economic analysis as follows: 
 
“The Commission’s role is to promote and protect competition and a specified public  
interest. It is not to second – guess the commercial decisions of precisely that element 
of the public that it is enjoined to defend, particularly where no threat to competition 
is entailed … . The Competition authorities, however well intentioned, are well 
advised not to pursue their public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner, lest 
they damage precisely those interests that they ostensibly seek to protect.” 
 
A further case in which a public interest issue arose indirectly was that of Wesbank, 
a division of FirstRand Bank Ltd / Industrial Machinery Finance Book
130
, owned by 
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Barloworld Equipment Finance, a division of Barloworld Capital (Pty) Ltd.
131
The 
merger involved the acquisition by Wesbank of Barloworld Equipment Finance’s 
industrial machinery book. This merger was not one with any anti-competitive effects, 
however, the Commission recommended that a condition be imposed on the proposed 
merger. The condition was that if customers were unable to secure finance from 
financial institutions, Barloworld Capital (the target firm) would retain the right to 
facilitate the financing. The rationale for the condition was that many of Barloworld 
Capital’s customers were small to medium sized businesses and businesses controlled 
by previously disadvantaged persons. The Commission argued that these customers’ 
interests and concerns needed to be protected and therefore suggested that the above 
condition be imposed.  
 
The Tribunal rejected the Commission’s condition and approved the merger without 
any conditions. The Tribunal listed a number of commercial factors, present in the 
financing industry, which, in their opinion protected the concerns and interests of 
small to medium sized black economic empowerment companies. It is evident from 
this case that the Tribunal rejected the Commission’s attempt to introduce black 
economic empowerment or promotion of small businesses as a justification for 
imposing a condition on a merger, where this was clearly unnecessary.  
Some of the above cases show that the commission has sometimes been blinded by 
empowerment aspects of merger transactions. In some other high profile cases, the 
Commission has recommended conditional approval where prohibition was clearly 
suggested from a pure competition perspective.  
 
7.4 The effect of a merger on the ability of national industries to compete on 
international markets 
 
The effect of a merger on the ability of national industries to compete on international 
markets must be considered. In the case of Nampak Ltd / Malbak Ltd
132
 the looked at 
this public interest grounds as provided for in section 12A(3)(d) of the Act. The 
parties are firms involved in the packaging sector with overlapping activities in 
folding cartons and flexible plastic packaging. 
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As part of their rationale for the transaction, the merged entity contended that it would 
be to compete more effectively for the business of multinational customers. The 
parties also contended that the merger would allow for deeper penetration of export 
markets. The Competition Tribunal noted that the pro-competitive arguments raised 
justified a merger on public interest grounds as provided for in section 12A(3)(d) of 
the Act. 
 
In their submission, the parties presented evidence relating to the scale of operations 
required to compete for the business of multinational customers and noted that: 
…a would-be supplier would not be able to compete for the business of this 
corporation without the scale and concomitant technology to match the output of this 
world scale plant – there is, in this production model, simply no room for the 
packaging producer geared to produce for the domestic market in which it is located 
plus a fractional export component. 
 
The Tribunal acknowledged the importance of multi-national customers to the parties’ 
business: 
Our decision is rooted in evidence, which strongly indicates significant developments 
in the manner in which multinational corporations organize their global production. 
These are manifest in an increasing centralization at selected locations of production 
units capable of serving a regional, continental or, even, global customer base. In a 
parallel development, multinational companies producing consumer non-durables, 
even those multinationals unable to centralize their production, are moving rapidly 
toward single-source purchasing of major inputs, including packaging. 
 
However, the Tribunal, in Tongaat-Hullet Group Ltd / Transvaal Suiker 
133
  warned 
that it will be reluctant to consider an argument that domination of a local market by a 
merged firm is necessary for international success. Economics of scale and 
rationalisation may be important here. However, the size of a firm in itself will not be 
conclusive. Where the merger does not increase the size of productive units, or allow 
them to operate more effectively, the Tribunal will not allow an anti-competitive 
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merger on this basis. Often, robust local competition will prepare firms for robust 
international competition. The arguments of the Tribunal show that there will be a 





The Tribunal, in Iscor Ltd / Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd
135
, decided that possible failure 
of a firm to the merger may also be relevant in determining whether the merger is in 
the public interest.
136
 In Tiger Brands Ltd / Langeberg Food International Ashton 
Canning Co (Pty) Ltd,
137
 an attempt to rely on the failing firm doctrine in terms of 
section 12A(2)(a)(i) was dismissed primarily because it was found that the merging 
firms were not really failing and it was not shown that there was no alternative suitor 
for any of them.
138
  The Tribunal was highly critical of an argument put forward by 
the parties to the effect that the merger could be approved on public interests grounds 
on the basis that failure of target firms will have a negative impact on the industrial 
region in which it operated, would lead to Major job losses, and would harm small 
business that would lose a major customer in the area. It called this argument an 
attempt to sustain a failed-firm argument through the back door that was 




The above cases illustrate the manner in public interest provisions in South Africa 
are interpreted by the Competition Authorities in their evaluation of mergers. 
Although the public interest test in merger review is clearly specified, the 
Competition Tribunal has been cautious in its consideration of this test. They are 
unlikely to prohibit a merger that is not anti-competitive, or approve a merger that is 
anti-competitive, on public interest grounds. The authorities appreciate the fact that 
Competition law is not directly aimed at protecting any of the public interests 
objectives. The Tribunal has decided that in many respects their jurisdiction in these 
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areas is secondary, as there are other statutes and institutions that are better placed and 
resourced to deal directly and effectively with these issues than they are. 
 
8. Criticism concerning the inclusion of public interest issues in the Competition 
Act 
 
One of its weakest points of the ‘public interest’ is that is open to many possible 
interpretations. The Act provides a list of substantial public interest grounds but there 
is a widespread opinion in institutional economics that there is no predefined public 
interest, therefore any regulation based on pursuing this objective is necessarily open 
to individual interests.
140
 The scope for error, flexible interpretation, subjectivity of 
judgement seems great.
141
 Prospective local or foreign investors could then well be 
deterred from takeover activity if there are to be unknown and unpredictable reactions 
by the authorities.
142
 A reduction in such activities could adversely affect exports, 





The benchmark of ‘public interest’ is seen as far less adequate for assessing damage 
caused by anti-competitive types of behaviour than ‘consumer welfare’ as stipulated 
in the Sherman Act or ‘social welfare’ (or ‘social optimum’) sometimes used in EU 
competition policy.
144
 The problem with ‘public interest’ is that it has a substantial but 
non-measurable political component. Microeconomic or Industrial Organisation 
theory do not provide analytical tools for measuring it while ‘consumer welfare’ (or, 
to a lesser extent, also ‘social welfare’) are such economic terms for which the size of 
change can be adequately assessed.  
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The problem of ‘public interest’ has been raised in a very sensitive social and 
economic context in South African competition policy. In Glaxo Wellcome plc / 
Smithkline plc,
145
 the Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”), a voluntary organisation 
that campaigned for affordable HIV/AIDS drugs, asked the Tribunal to approave a 
merger between multi-national pharmaceutical firms subject to a condition that the 
merged firm allow competition by producers of generic drugs, which could be used to 
treat opportunistic infections in HIV/AIDS cases and anti-retrovirals for HIV. The 
Tribunal stated that it was sympathetic to the cause of the TAC, but there was no 
product overlap between the merging firms, which allowed for the imposition of such 
a condition in a competition case. It apparently thought that none of the public interest 




Even though the South African economy is very seriously suffering from the 
consequences of AIDS and the National labour supply is largely hit by AIDS, the 
Tribunal realised that no competition policy tool was to be effectively used in this 
matter of really great ‘public interest’. Such a decision can come in defence of ‘Public 
interest’ that public interest as such is not a basis of decision making under the 
Competition Act. 
 
Another criticism of public interest has been what the definition includes. The socio-
economic objectives incorporate redistribution, labour interests and black economic 
empowerment.
147
 It is argued that relying on competition policy to achieve these 
objectives is inappropriate.
148
 There are more specific (and hence more effective) 
policies that can be used.
149
 The overall welfare is seen as greatest when the resources 
of society are allocated in the economy so that consumers are able to satisfy their 
wants as far as technological and physical constraints permit.
150
 In this way the wealth 
of the nation is maximised. The aim of competition policy should be to help bring 
about this result.
151
 When government wishes to achieve other objectives ( e.g to 
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redistribute income or wealth, to promote the interests of historically disadvantaged 
groups or to encouraged structural, regional or national organisational changes other 
policies should be applied.
152
 Anti-trust authorities may note such goals, but they are a 




It has also been stated that it will be difficult to determine the public interest and that 
it may be a “policy at war with itself”.
154
 The asserted public interest can pull 
competition authorities in opposite directions.
155
 As seen in the in the matter between 
Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd v Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd,
156
 the 
different public interest criteria themselves do not always point in the same direction. 
A procedure for dealing with such situations has been developed.
157
 
• Every public interest ground asserted must be viewed in isolation to 
determine whether it is substantial.
158
 
• If more than one contradictory public interest factor is found to be 
substantial, then the competition authority must attempt to reconcile them. 
• If no reconciliation is possible, then the conflicting aspects must be 
balanced and a net conclusion must be reached. However in the 
Distillers
159
 matter the Tribunal observed that a balancing seldom will be 
necessary. It stated that 
“this is because a contradiction can be of two types. One when the opposite 
interests collide head on, like two medieval knights in jousting contest where only 
one can emerge as victor and continue his course. This is where we are faced with 
a stark choice of whether to prohibit or to approve. The other situation is where 
the opposite interests avoid one another like vehicles bypassing each other in 
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In this case the merger could be approved on pure competition grounds. Accordingly, 
it was not necessary to weigh public interest factors unless it could be shown that a 
public interest factor, when viewed in isolation, would justify prohibition of a merger. 
 
The incorporation of public interest grounds in the Act may also be criticised for 
creating unnecessary litigation or causing unnecessary delays in mergers. 
Substantively, the workloads of the Competition Commission and the Tribunal have 
overwhelmingly been concentrated on merger control. 
 
It is argued that in most hostile take-overs, the target firm will rely on public interest 
grounds as a last bid to prevent the take over. Where pure competition issues fail, the 
public interest is invoked with enthusiasm. Firms that are not known for their love of 
labour or empowerment become overnight the standard bearers of social equity.
161
 
This has been the case dating back to the failed Nedbank bid for Standard Bank 




In the matter between Gold Fields limited and Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Limited,
163
 Gold Fields, asked the Competition Tribunal to block the merger on public 
interest grounds alone, even if the merger would not prevent or lessen competition. 
Harmony countered that though it must take public interest into account, the tribunal’s 
core mandate is competition. 
In giving its reasons for approving the hostile take-over by Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Limited of Gold Fields Limited, the Tribunal carefully considered the 
argument and evidence regarding the impact of the transaction on public interest. The 
tribunal first looked at the legal position as set out in Section 12A of the Competition 
Act. Gold fields argued that if a merger raised no competition problems and no 
negative public interest issues, it must still be prohibited if there is no evidence that it 
can be justified on public interest grounds.
164
 Thus when making a public interest 
enquiry, the tribunal has to first ask if the merger cannot be justified on public interest 
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grounds. If they come to the conclusion that there is no basis for concluding that there 
is not, the Tribunal cannot close the book and walk away.
165
 The Act requires them to 
consider if the merger can be justified on public interest grounds. If there is no 
evidence that the merger can be justified on public interest grounds it must be 
prohibited.
166
 In other words, unless there is a positive public interest gain from a 
merger, it must be prohibited. The Tribunal found this conclusion to be far-reaching, 




As observed by the Tribunal, Gold Fields conclusion may be attributed to the fact that 
the Act requires the tribunal to have regard to public interest criteria even if no 
competition issue is implicated. This is because of the wording of s12A (b), which 
makes the public interest test mandatory in all merger assessments. Gold fields noted 
that because of the word ‘otherwise’ found in section 12A(b), the Act requires the 
Tribunal to have regard to Public interest criteria.
168
 Public interest can operate either 
to resurrect a merger that is anti-competitive or condemn a merger that has survived 
the competitive assessment. Gold Fields also went on to note that in the purpose 
section of the Act, section 2, public interest criteria are reflected in some sections such 





Through this, Gold fields then argued that section 12A is a reading of the Act that 
requires divorcing the Public interest from any relationship to competition.
170
 
The argument was stomped on pretty smartly by the tribunal, who first looked at the 
fact that the South African Competition Act is structured in a way that ensures that 
when public interest considerations are factored into a merger evaluation, this is 
always done through the filter of the competition analysis. The mere sequencing of 
the evaluation, with the authority required to make a finding first on competition 
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grounds, then follows Public interest test means that Public interest cannot be 
divorced from any relationship from competition. 
The Tribunal emphasised that the section says that a competition evaluation must be 
done first. If the merger passes the competition evaluation it then follows the Public 
interest test as provided in section 12A (1) (b). If the merger is found to be anti-
competitive then the next stages provided in sub-section (a) follow.
171
 First one 
performs the efficiency trade-off required by (a) (i) the efficiency trade-off can be 
greater than and offset the anti-competitive effects in which case the merger can again 
be considered to have passed the competition inquiry and be like the merger that 
followed the path of subsection (b).
172
 If the efficiency trade-off does not redeem the 




What is evident then is that under path (b) a merger emerges always having passed the 
competition enquiry, but a merger under path (a) may, depending on the verdict of 
efficiency trade off, pass or fail the competition test.
174
  
The Tribunal therefore found that mergers following either path are then subject to the 
public interest inquiry. The (a) merger does so in terms of (a)(ii) and the (b) in terms 
of that sub-paragraph.
175
 The language of the public interest is therefore identical for 
both namely, whether the merger “can or cannot be justified on substantial public 
interest grounds by assessing the factors set out in subsection (3).”
176
 
The Tribunal found that under path (a), the words can or cannot indicate that a merger 
that has failed the competition test can still be passed on public interest test and hence 
be approved. Also, that a merger that has passed the competition test could still fail 
the public interest test and hence be prohibited.
177
 But this interpretation does not 
explain why under path (b) where only have passed mergers the legislature still 
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provides for a “can”, because there is no need of transforming a merger as only 
passed mergers go there.
178
  
Gold Fields therefore argue that the word “can” is otherwise superfluous in paragraph 
(b) unless it can be given the interpretation for which they contend.
179
 They argue that 
one not only has to determine whether the merger “cannot” be justified on public 
interest grounds, but also assuming the rationale for “cannot”, still prove that it can, 
that is, the existence of a positive impact on public interest.
180
 It then follows that the 
only way you can account for the can and cannot as alternative in the same phrase is 
to adopt this approach. 
But, as the Tribunal rightfully points out, neither logic nor the manner in which 
section 12A is construed or sensible public policy, support this interpretation. Gold 
Fields argument does not make sense because means that a firm has to justify a 
merger solely on Public interest grounds, not on competition grounds whereas this is a 
statute concerned primarily on competition. 
The Tribunal also pointed out that the use of the words can or cannot by the 
legislature may be because public interest grounds once evaluated, do not always 
point to the same net conclusion.
181
 In certain cases, they may lead to opposing 
conclusions, which require internal weighing up to lead to some net conclusion on 
public interest.
182
 It also found that Gold fields argument that section 2 supports the 
interpretation of section 12A of the autonomy of the Public interest concerns in the 
Act not to be correct. Although some sub-paragraphs of section 2 refer to purely 
public interest concerns they do so in competition context.
183
 Section 2 commences 
with the injunction that “the purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain 
competition in the Republic in order…” The Public interest in the purpose section is 
seen clearly as dependent not independent of competition.
184
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Gold Fields approach was seen not to be consistent with the policy of the Act. The 
Tribunal acknowledges that while our public interest requirements are an anathema to 
merger control policy, few would argue for a position that mergers are so inherently 
harmful, that absent a positive contribution to public interest, a merger that raises not 
competition concerns must be stopped. On the other hand the contrary position is 
compelling. That is, a merger that raises no competition concerns and no negative 
public interest concerns should be permitted.
185
  The Tribunal therefore found that as 
a matter of law, it was not necessary for Harmony to show that the merger can be 
justified on public interest grounds. All that they had to establish, having found that 
the merger will not have a likely anti-competitive effect, is that the merger will not 
have a substantial negative effect on public interest.
186
 
This is a case that has proved interesting, precisely because it has, arguably, little or 
nothing to do with competition issues. No gold producer, however large, can 
influence the gold price. A merged Harmony-Gold Fields might be bad for 
competition upstream, in supplier industries, and some of the evidence and argument 
at the tribunal was around that. The case shows that the incorporation of public 
interest grounds in the Act may create unnecessary litigation and cause unnecessary 
delays in hostile take-overs. Gold Fields merely invoking public interest as a way of 
preventing the take over.  
When the competition issues failed the core of Gold Fields’ case was that a merger 
would drive up unemployment and poverty in an industry that had already lost 
hundreds of thousands of jobs. 
One question raised at the hearings was what, if anything, the competition authorities 
should do about it and whether their role extended beyond their core mandate so that 
they could, or should, make decisions based on public interest alone. Another 
question was whether this merger would make things better or worse. Gold Fields 
argued it would significantly worsen joblessness; Harmony that it could ultimately 
make it better by making mining more efficient.  
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It is therefore submitted that the delays caused by conducting a public interest 
analysis reflects negatively to South Africa’s reputation in International Anti-trust. 
Conducting a proper assessment of competition factors whilst simultaneously 
conducting a public interest enquiry and analysis, makes it difficult to achieve 
consistency on timing due to the lengthened review periods required for public 
interest analysis. This can be problematic for parties hoping to finalise a global deal as 
soon as possible. It would appear that achieving consistency on substantive outcomes 
may be more important. Longer review period may be required in appropriate 
circumstances than in a jurisdiction where only a competition evaluation is required. 
 Accordingly, conducting both a competition analysis and a public interest analysis 
may be difficult to converge to an agreed standard on timing if more time may be 
required to conduct a proper review of the matter. An element of uncertainty is also 
introduced owing to potential interveners who may seek to protect certain adversely 
affected interests. This was evident in the Anglo America / Kumba (IDC interverning) 
case. 
The tribunal has set public interest conditions for merger approvals. But it is unlikely 
that it will ever block a merger on public interest grounds alone. If it did, it would be 
intervening in broader public policy areas, opening itself to challenges from all sides. 
It would also, in effect, be trying to second-guess the market — and who’s to know 
that investors aren’t as well, or better, placed to judge, which is the better 
management team? The specific mention in the merger evaluation is therefore 
unnecessary because the approval of a merger is ultimately based on a sound 
economic analysis. In other words the incorporation of public interest goals creates 
unnecessary and unwelcome delays. 
9. Support for the inclusion of Public Interest objectives in the Act 
 
Although there has been criticism concerning the inclusion of public interest issues in 
the Competition Act, their inclusion has to be read in context. Competition law forms 
an important part of effective market governance.
187
 The rules of the market game, 
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that include competition rules, can enhance market outcomes by promoting not only 
the achievement of efficiencies, but also greater equity.
188
 To this extent South 
Africa’s competition law is progressive in its explicit incorporation of public interest 
considerations; whereas even mature jurisdictions shy away from such potentially 
contentious territory.
189
 With South Africa’s history, the inclusion of public interest 
concerns makes good policy sense. The nature of the South African economy, its 
grossly unequal distribution of income and wealth, and hence too its inequality of 
economic opportunity have to be addressed by a coherent set of policy initiatives. 
Thus employment creation, black economic empowerment and small and medium-





As sated above, employment creation and black economic empowerment are major 
challenges to sustainable development in South Africa. Explicit reference to these 
factors is thus to be expected in a significant area of policy and law such as the 
competition Act. In some sense this provides a balance of considerations in the 
challenge to develop a set of complementary policies and laws to facilitate enterprise 
development and the achievement of broader socio-economic objectives.  
 
South Africa just like many other developing countries is faced with the challenge of 
the spread of AIDS, underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty. The AIDS 
epidemic on its own has resulted in the growth of orphaned children and shortage of 
skilled labour. With such problems, including none-competition grounds in the South 
African competition policy can be understood as another way to address social 
problems and inequalities.  
 
David Lewis (Chairperson of the Tribunal) has readily conceded that public interest 
considerations weigh more heavily in developing countries than they do in developed 
countries.
191
 He argues that the reasons for this are instructive: first, it is widely 
accepted that there is a greater role for industrial policy, for targeting support at 







 www.comptrib.co.za/Publications/Speeches/lewis5.pdf David Lewis Chairperson Competition 
Tribunal The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation 28-29 September 2002  
 50 
strategically selected sectors or interest groups, in developing than in developed 
countries; secondly, developing country competition authorities are still engaged in a 
very basic struggle to achieve credibility and legitimacy in their countries.
192
 He also 
acknowledges that:  
"…Credibility will certainly not be achieved by bending to the whim of every interest 
group, nor will it be secured by a competition authority that refuses to take direct 
account of major national economic problems and aspirations. Hence, in a country 
like South Africa while we in the competition authorities may well understand the 
pitfalls in balancing competition and public interest, we equally recognise that a 
competition statute that simply ignored the impact of its decisions on employment or 
on securing a greater spread of black ownership, would consign the act and the 




Developing country agencies have a long way to go in achieving this credibility and it 
will not be achieved by standing aloof from those issues that most engage popular 
sentiment. In addition many regimes, especially developing country regimes, impose 
a public interest test on those merger decisions that fall squarely within the 
jurisdiction of the competition authorities. Hence employees threatened by a merger 
are well advised to show that they have sought the protection of the Labour Relations 
Act before invoking the Competition Act in their defense. By the same token 
employers who have ignored these obligations are likely to be reminded of them when 




The incorporation of public interest objectives in the Competition Act can also be 
traced back to the history of the South African Competition policy. The institutional 
framework of South African competition policy seemed to be reformed in 1979 with 
the creation of a Competition Board. The members of this Board had to be appointed 
by the Minister of Trade and Industry or other members of the government. At least in 
principle, the Board had the powers to start investigations on its own. This was, 
however, only one new element of the ‘tripartite system’ suggested by the inquiry, 
and the decision-making arm of it was not created. The executive powers in 








competition policy remained with the Minister, and the reports actually produced by 
the Board were mostly used as reading material by government officials but had no 
real implications on patterns of structure or behaviour in competition.  
 
This institutional problem underlined another very important weakness of the 1979 
competition law. Namely, that it did not make a distinction between antitrust and the 
control of anti-competitive actions by the government. This distinction is important in 
a competition policy. It has been frequent in developing countries that competition 
policy had to fight government-made obstacles to competition or that only a strong-
willed competition authority could be successful when confronting governments 
indifferent to competition issues. The Board very rarely investigated anti-competitive 
behaviour by government bodies or state-owned firms, and such investigations were 
not followed by disciplinary action. This is easy to understand since the Board was 
politically and administratively subordinated to the government, and its members 
were not at all independent from the state. Some of the most important shortcomings 
of the law were corrected in 1984 as a result of an initiative taken by the Competition 
Board. Some kinds of conduct were declared per se against the law. These practices 
included RPM (resale price maintenance), horizontal collusion (on prices, sales terms 
or market shares), and bid rigging. In a very classical style (reminiscent of early 
American activism), the violations of such prohibitions were supposed to be pursued 
as criminal acts, but no such punitive action was taken by the government between 
1984 and 1994. 
  
The inefficiency of pre-1994 South African competition policy was the result of three 
major shortcomings of the 1979 competition law. First, it did not create an adequate 
benchmark for establishing the anti-competitive character of any kind of structure or 
conduct observed on the market. Along with this, the almost complete lack of per se 
prohibitions made it extremely difficult to proceed against violations of the law. 
Second, competition policy was fully integrated in the structure of government and it 
did not enjoy any degree of political independence. Therefore it could be used rather 
by than against the government. It could be used as a tool for protecting the economic 
interests of the ruling political elite supported only by a minority of the population. 
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 Its overhaul became thus a political necessity after the change of political regime. 
For these political reasons, the reform of South African competition policy had 
to go far beyond the scope of competition policy, as it is usually understood by 
literature. Among other things, it had to contribute to changing the ownership 
structure of the economy in favour of the ethnical groups (mainly Blacks) who had 
been basically excluded from the ownership of entrepreneurial assets of some 
importance for the national economy. In fact, the playing field tilted in favour of 
certain groups of Whites had to be levelled in order to create markets with more or 
less equal chances for entrepreneurs belonging to different ethnic groups.  
 
It is therefore submitted that a balance between traditional competition policy 
objectives and public interest considerations is achievable. The cases on the 
consideration of mergers in South Africa as reviewed above indicate that competition 
law is an instrument used to promote South Africa's specific industrial policies. 
However, as shown in the cases, the Competition Authorities in South Africa have not 
been arbitrary in the application of the provisions on public interest. The balancing of 
public interest considerations with a competition evaluation has been very carefully 
considered as is illustrated in the cases discussed. 
 
It is further submitted that the incorporation of public interest objectives in 
competition legislation in South Africa does not mean that the overriding objectives 
of competition policy will not be achieved. In fact, South Africa’s competition 
legislation is an example of a jurisdiction where a substantial degree of convergence 
with international anti-trust may be achieved despite the incorporation of non-
competition factors in the legislation and potential or perceived difficulties in 
reconciling competition evaluation with a public interest analysis.  
 
The commitment of authorities to achieve the level of convergence is evident by the 
fact that the incorporation of provisions in the merger regulation promoting 
employment and black economic empowerment, have to date not been a bar to 
obtaining merger approval since the decisions are ultimately based on sound 
economic analysis.  
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It may therefore be deduced that a degree of convergence can nevertheless be 
achieved since the South African Competition Authorities in their application of the 
law view public interest as secondary concept to the economic analysis. Public 
interest seems to be limited by definition in the legislation. In other words, the 
competition evaluation on whether for example, a merger will prevent or lessen 
competition still occupies a primary position, thereafter the public interest test is 
treated as a filter and is given secondary consideration.  
 
The ability to achieve a certain level of convergence may also be attributed to the fact 
that the provisions on competition aspects are similar to the provisions in laws of 
mature jurisdictions like Canada. Certain public interest provisions as found in South 
Africa also feature in industrialized countries, namely promotion of small businesses 
and promotion of the ability of national firms to compete in international markets. The 
Canadian Competition Act has specifically incorporated such objective and it may be 
a consideration in certain mergers. 
 
Furthermore, the South African legislation stipulates that in applying the Act, 
appropriate foreign and international law may be considered. The Competition 
Authorities are mindful also of the risk of deterring foreign direct investment if it had 
to impose burdensome requirements and processes on parties. In the Tepco/Shell the 
Tribunal warned the Commission against being overzealous in applying public 
interest. This demonstrates commitment in sustaining a certain level of convergence.  
 
10. Reconciling traditional competition policy objectives and public interest 
considerations in merger control evaluation. 
 Section 2 of the Competition Act
195
 begins by stating that the purpose of the Act is to 
promote and maintain competition in the Republic.  The section sets down a number 
of goals, which the Act aims to achieve including goals, which are viewed, as 
independent of competition concerns. Section 12A also begins by stating that 
whenever required to consider a merger, competition authorities must first determine 
whether or not the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, by 
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assessing factors which it sets out in subsection 2. The section also provides that a 
merger should be assessed on public interest grounds. 
The South African legislation on public interest is therefore unusual in certain key 
respects: 
• First, the inclusion of a public interest test is unusually explicit and, 
simultaneously, confined by Section 12A(3) to a set of specific criteria. This 
may then give the competition authorities the power to prohibit or impose 
conditions upon a merger that passes the evaluation on competition grounds. 
• Second, it is the competition authorities – rather than a Minister or some other 
representative of the public – that is required to make the public interest 
judgment. The Act does however require that the Minister of Trade and 
Industry (or, in particular cases, other directly affected Ministers) be served 
with a copy of the merger notification in order to enable them to plead their 
case before the competition authorities. 
The competition authorities are then put in this difficult position of trying to reconcile 
competition objectives and public interest goals in merger controls. As illustrated by 
the cases, the authorities have tended to take a cautious approach to public interest 
pleas. The view of the Tribunal – articulated in some cases on mergers, is that each 
public interest afforded protection in the Competition Act is more comprehensively 
protected through other statutory and regulatory instruments. Accordingly, in 
enforcing the public interest factors stipulated in the act, the competition authorities 
should seek to complement the range of other interventions principally tasked with 
underpinning a given public interest. 
The Act’s public interest defences have been subject to predictable criticism by anti-
trust practitioners. However, their inclusion has to be seen in the specific context of 
the society out of which this act emerges. Employment and Black economic 
empowerment represent major societal concerns and national policy objectives. It is 
unthinkable that reference to these key concerns would have been omitted from a 
piece of socio-economic legislation as significant as the Competition Act. Their 
inclusion and the willingness of the competition authorities to grapple with the 
difficult balance between public interest and competition has added considerable 
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credibility to the act and the institutions that it has created. That the competition 
authorities are seen as institutions intent upon promoting participation in the 
economic life of the nation is strengthened by the explicit inclusion of these public 
interest considerations. 
The way the South African Competition Act is structured enables the competition 
authorities to balance public interest and competition in merger evaluation, through 
the filter of the competition analysis. As stated in the Gold fields and Harmony 
matter, the mere sequencing of the evaluation, with the authority required to make a 
finding first on competition grounds, promotes this. This therefore explains why, to 
date, public interest factors have not, on their own, determined the outcome of a 
merger evaluation. The overall outcome has, without exception, been determined by 
the competition analysis (or, in the one case, by efficiency considerations) with public 
interest considerations occasionally informing conditions attached to an approval. 
The fact that a single agency – the competition agency – is responsible for balancing 
the competition and public interest factors also underpins the centrality accorded 
competition factors in the authorities’ decisions. During the drafting of the Act there 
was active public debate regarding the locus of decision making with respect to public 
interest. It was resolved to locate all decision making in the competition authority. At 
the same time the Act provides that the Minister of Trade and Industry and the 
representative trades union in the affected workplaces are provided with notice of any 
proposed transaction specifically to enhance their ability to present public interest 
arguments to the competition authorities.  
Other interested parties are entitled to apply to ‘intervene’ in merger proceedings 
before the Tribunal. In the case of large mergers – or appeals from decisions of 
intermediate mergers – the arguments are ventilated at public hearings and the 
decisions, with full reasons, are published. This ensures that the competition 
authorities actually confront the public interest factors – while competition may well 
be the primary filter in any decision, the process ensures that the competition 
authorities do not remove the public interest considerations from the frame. 
Some people may argue that the South African competition regime is well served by 
the explicit introduction of public interest factors and by its limited definition. This 
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ensures that while there is no room to hide from the difficult task of investigating and 
adjudicating public interest claims, there is equally no incentive to clothe a public 
interest decision in the garb of competition analysis. In developing countries it is 
difficult to negate public interest concerns. 
 
 David Lewis, the Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal has consistently defended 
those sections of the competition legislation that cater for concessions based on public 
interest concerns. In his view, public interest is ‘the mad, old uncle that comes 
knocking on the door when we have nowhere to hide.
196
’ The only solution is to find 
some way of living with him. In short, no public agency that relies on public support 
can escape the influence of a strongly held public interest. Furthermore, Lewis 
counters that it is inevitable that in a developing country such as South Africa, where 
distributional and poverty problems are at the forefront, all social and economic 
policies are expected to contribute to the alleviation of these problems.
197
 Competition 
policy is not exempt from this expectation and under these circumstances it is better to 
be seen to be grappling with such issues transparently and effectively rather than 
occupying a purist view of what competition policy should consist of.
198
 
It can also be argued that many regimes claim to uphold a ‘pure’ competition analysis 
whilst responding to overwhelming public interest by tailoring a competition analysis 
to support a decision that has actually been made on public interest grounds.  In the 
case of South Africa, there is no necessity to engage in this kind of obfuscation, as the 
competition authorities are explicitly required to consider public interest. 
At the same time, the drafters elected to limit the range of factors that may be claimed 
under public interest. The South African legislation’s scope is limited to four clearly 
stated grounds. Accordingly, in South Africa an interest group that wishes to invoke 
public interest must demonstrate that the merger compromises the four stated criteria 
contained in the Act, which authorities do not have to assess a new ground each time.  
Competition law and jurisprudence is, for the most part, a product of the most 
advanced industrialised economies and is increasingly formulated in response to 
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sophisticated advances in economic theory as well as detailed and complex empirical 
analysis. Whilst globalization advances in economic theory, it presents challenges to 
developing countries. In giving a lecture on globalization, at Santa Clara University, 
Amantra Sen,
199




 He said that two important recognitions are central our understanding the relation 
between markets and inequality.
201
 First, the market economy can generate very 
different results, depending on how physical resources are distributed, how human 
resources are developed, what rules of the fame prevail, and so on.
202
 Second, he 
believes that the market on its own is not the only institution in which decisions are 
taken, social and political institutions have a positive role to play in promoting equity 
and in enhancing what the markets can achieve, within each country and more 
broadly, in the world.
203
 
Sen believes that there are various factors that prevent Globalization from producing 
results.
204
  First, there has to be global commitment to democracy. He sees no conflict 
between promoting economic growth and supporting democracies and social rights. In 
f act, he believes that democratic freedoms and social opportunities can contribute 
substantially to economic development. Second, he believes that even though private 
foreign investment can, in many situations, help a poor country get richer, there are 
safeguards that are needed to avoid being overly influenced by the power of large 
multinational companies. Third, he also believes that the distribution of benefits of 
international interactions depends on a variety of global institutional arrangements, 
including trade agreements, medical initiatives, educational exchanges, facilities for 
technological dimension, ecological and environmental restraints, and fair treatment 
for accumulated debts. Forth, patents, inequalities and inefficiencies. He feels that the 
intellectual property rights and patent laws often have a profound negative effect on 
the lives and freedoms of many people in the world. He gives an example that these 
laws tend to inhibit the use of life-saving medicine vital for diseases like AIDS-by 
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making inexpensively produced drugs remarkably expensive through high 
royalties.
205
   
He therefore believes that in as much as globalization deserves strong defence, it also 
demands many far-reaching reforms. He feels that when we welcome, rightly, the 
great efficiency of market transactions, we also have to find ways and means of 
strengthening the non-market institutions that can complement and countervail the 
enormous power of the global market economy.
206
 There is a compelling need in the 
contemporary world to ask questions not only about the economics of globalization, 
but also to place these questions in an appropriately historical and political 
perspective and to relate them to the demands of contemporary global ethics.
207
  
The argument by Sen justifies why public interest has been explicitly included in 
South Africa’s competition policy. As stated before, the inclusion has to be seen in the 
context of the society out of which this Act emerges. Employment and Black 
economic empowerment represent a major societal concerns and national policy 
objectives. It therefore makes sense to refer to these key concerns in the Competition 
Act. 
11.Conclusion 
 This discussion has made it clear that having public interest objectives explicitly 
included in the Act is important. Prior 1994, the distortions by government regulation, 
high levels of concentration in ownership and control, and vertically integrated 
conglomerate organisations were not conditions supportive of a strong competition 
culture and robust competition processes. This meant that the usual objective of 
competition policy to promote competition and economic efficiency was important, 
but at the same time, broader public interest objectives were also important. Public 
interest objectives mattered in the context of competition policy even though they 
were also to be pursued through other policy channels 
This discussion has also made it clear that having public interest objectives explicitly 
included in the Act with regard to merger reviews has not and is unlikely to materially 
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impact on decisions by competition authorities. Authorities have on the other hand 
been able to strike a balance between public interest and competition objectives. 
The discussion has also shown that it is important to develop a more coherent position 
for public interest in the context of the Act. Such an approach has to be applied in a 
consistent manner to avoid perceptions that competition considerations and public 
interest considerations are in equal weighting. That in some cases public interest 
issues may take precedence and some of the cases perhaps competition concerns may 
actually take precedence because it is decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The two-stage inquiry is the right approach, given that public interest is described in 
section 12A(3) at a high level of abstraction and generality. The two-stage approach 
therefore creates a more coherent position for public interest in the context of the Act. 
The task in balancing public interest and competition considerations is eased by 
having public interest evaluated separately from the competition analysis. The 
primacy of the competition evaluation is secured by the structure of the Act which 
provides that the competition evaluation is completed as the prior step in the decision 
making process and, hence, that the public interest test is conducted through the filter 
of a completed competition finding.  
This structure accordingly underpins a developing jurisprudence that tends to have the 
principal decision – to prohibit or allow a merger – taken on competition grounds with 
the public interest considerations possible accounting for the imposition of conditions 
carefully crafted to ameliorate the negative public interest impact. Also the 
Competition Tribunal has held quite explicitly that the protection that the Competition 
Act gives to the specified categories of public interest is ancillary to the protection 
offered by other legislation specifically directed at protecting those elements of public 
interest.  
The Act has the effect of making the trade-offs clearer and prevents any temptation to 
camouflage public interest decisions by presenting them in the light of competition 
analysis. To avoid unnecessary lengthy litigation, the legislature should, in time, 
reconsider some general aspects of the place of public interest in the merger 
evaluation. One possibility is that public interest criteria only be considered as a 
defence to mergers found to be anti-competitive, and not as a possible bar to a merger 
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that passes the competition evaluation. This will greatly assists competition 
authorities when trying to balance competition goals and public interest. It will also 
do away with speculations on whether a merger found to be competitive can be barred 
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